Nexus Authorization Logic (NAL): Logical Results by Hirsch, Andrew K. & Clarkson, Michael R.
ar
X
iv
:1
21
1.
37
00
v2
  [
cs
.C
R]
  1
6 N
ov
 20
12
Nexus Authorization Logic (NAL):
Logical Results
Andrew K. Hirsch Michael R. Clarkson
Department of Computer Science
George Washington University
{akhirsch, clarkson}@gwu.edu
November 15, 2012
Abstract
Nexus Authorization Logic (NAL) [Schneider et al. 2011] is a logic for reasoning
about authorization in distributed systems. A revised version of NAL is given here,
including revised syntax, a revised proof theory using localized hypotheses, and a new
Kripke semantics. The proof theory is proved sound with respect to the semantics, and
that proof is formalized in Coq.
1 Introduction
Authorization logics are epistemic logics used to reason about whether principles are per-
mitted to take actions in a distributed computer system. Nexus Authorization Logic (NAL),
invented by Schneider et al. [8], is notable for enabling rich reasoning about axiomatic, syn-
thetic, and analytic bases for authorization of actions. NAL extends a well-known autho-
rization logic, cut-down dependency core calculus (CDD) [1]. Among other features, NAL
upgrades CDD from having only propositional variables to having functions and predicates
on system state.
The NAL rationale [8] gives a natural-deduction proof system for the logic and sketches
the intuition for a semantics based on the idea of a worldview, which is the set of statements
that a principle believes, or would be prepared to support. However, neither a formal se-
mantics nor a proof of soundness is given in the rationale.
Here, we initiate the formal study of the metatheory of NAL by developing a formal
semantics and a proof of soundness. Along the way, we streamline NAL in various ways,
particularly in the syntax (by eliminating second-order quantification) and in the proof sys-
tem (by localizing hypothetical judgments). We also fix a bug in the original proof system,
which allowed derivation of a formula that arguably should be considered invalid.
Since our formalization of NAL differs from that of the NAL rationale, it will be conve-
nient to have names to distinguish these two formal systems. Henceforth, we write “NAL0”
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to refer to the original formalization of the NAL rationale [8], and “NAL1” to refer to the
new formalization in this paper.
Our proof of soundness, including the syntax, proof system, and semantics of NAL1,
is formalized in the Coq proof assistant.1 The formalization contains about 3,000 lines of
code.
This short paper describes our formal syntax, proof system, and semantics for NAL. Fa-
miliarity with epistemic logics, constructive logics, and their Kripke semantics is assumed.
Readers who seek background in these areas can consult standard references [3, 10].
2 Syntax
NAL1 is a constructive, first order, multimodal logic. It has two syntactic classes, terms τ
and formulas φ. Metavariable x ranges over first-order variables, f over first-order func-
tions, and r over first-order relations. Logical formulas φ are described by the following
grammar:
φ ::= true
| false
| r(τ, . . . , τ) first-order relation
| τ1 = τ2 term equality
| φ1 ∧ φ2 conjunction
| φ1 ∨ φ2 disjunction
| φ1 ⇒ φ2 implication
| ¬φ negation
| (∀x : φ) first-order universal quantification
| (∃x : φ) first-order existential quantification
| τ says φ affirmation
| τ1 ⇛ τ2 delegation
| τ1 ⇛ τ2 on (x : φ) restricted delegation
Unlike NAL0, formulas of NAL1 do not permit monadic second-order universal quantifi-
cation. In NAL0, that quantifier was used only to define certain connectives, particularly
delegation, as syntactic sugar. NAL1 instead adds delegation as a primitive connective to
the logic. This simplifies the logic from second-order down to first-order, at the small cost
of adding a few extra axioms to the proof system to handle the delegation primitive.
Logical terms are described by the following grammar:
1http://coq.inria.fr
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τ ::= x first-order variable
| f(τ, . . . , τ) first-order function
| τ1.τ2 subprincipal
| {x : φ} group principal
There are some small, unimportant syntactic differences between NAL0 and NAL1.
The biggest of these is the notation for delegation: NAL0 uses →, whereas NAL1 uses ⇛
to avoid any potential confusion with implication.
3 Proof System
The NAL1 proof system is a natural-deduction proof system, like the NAL0 proof system.
But unlike the NAL0 proof system, which uses hypothetical judgments for proving impli-
cation introduction, the NAL1 proof system uses localized hypotheses.
In NAL1, the derivability judgment is written
Γ ⊢ φ
where Γ is a set of formulas. If Γ ⊢ φ, then φ is derivable from Γ according to the rules
of the proof system. Rules for formulas are given in figure 1. Rules for terms are given in
figure 2. In those figures, φ[τ/x] denotes capture-avoiding substitution of τ for x in φ.
Most of the proof system is routine. The rules for says use notation p says Γ, which
intuitively means that p says all the formulas in set Γ. Formally, p says Γ is the set {p says
φ | φ ∈ Γ}. The says rules necessarily differ from the corresponding rules found in NAL0
because of the use of localized hypotheses Γ. Nonetheless, the NAL1 rules are essentially
standard—for example, two of the three rules correspond to standard natural deduction rules
for a necessity modality [6], and the third rule is symmetric to the second.
There is one important, deliberate change in the NAL1 proof system that makes its
theory differ from the NAL0 system, which we now discuss. There are two standard ways
of importing beliefs into a principal’s worldview. The first is a rule known as Necessitation:
“if ⊢ p then ⊢ p says φ.” The second is an axiom known as Unit: ⊢ p⇒ (p says φ).
Though superficially similar, Necessitation and Unit lead to different theories.
Example 1. Machines M1 and M2 execute processes P1 and P2, respectively. M1 has
a register R. Let Z be a proposition representing “register R is currently set to zero.”
According to Unit, ⊢ Z ⇒ (P1 says Z) and ⊢ Z ⇒ (P2 says Z). The former means that
a process on a machine knows the current contents of a register on that machine; the latter
means that a process on a different machine must also know the current contents of the
register. But according to Necessitation, if ⊢ Z then ⊢ P1 says Z and ⊢ P2 says Z . Only
if R is always zero must the two processes say so.
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Unit, therefore, is better used when propositions (or relations or functions) represent
global state upon which all principals are guaranteed to agree. Necessitation is better used
when propositions represent local state that could be unknown to some principals.
NAL was designed to reason about state in distributed systems, where principals (such
as machines) may have local state, and where global state does not necessarily exist—the
reading at a clock, for example, is not agreed upon by all principals in NAL. So Unit would
be an overly strong restriction on NAL principals; Necessitation is the appropriate choice.
Fortunately, NAL0 does include Necessitation as an inference rule and does not include
Unit as an axiom.
Unfortunately, NAL0 [8] permits Unit to be derived as a theorem2 because of an inter-
action between Necessitation and the NAL0 introduction rule for implication. NAL1 fixes
this bug and does not permit derivation of Unit.
4 Semantics
The semantics of NAL1 is combination of three standard semantic models: first-order mod-
els, constructive models, and modal models. This combination is probably not completely
novel (see, e.g., [4, 11]), though we are not aware of any authorization logic semantics that
is identical to or that subsumes our semantics. Our presentation mostly follows the Kripke
semantics of intuitionistic predicate calculus given by Troelstra and van Dalen [10].
Below, we give a moderately pedagogic description of the definition of a semantic
model for NAL, by building up progressively more complicated models.
First-order models. A first-order model with equality is a tuple (D,=, R, F ). The pur-
pose of a first-order model is to interpret the first-order fragment of the logic, specifically
first-order quantification, functions, and relations. D is a set, the domain of individuals.
These individuals are what quantification in the logic ranges over. R is a set {ri | i ∈ I}
of relations on D, indexed by set I , with associated arity function m, such that ri ⊆ Dm(i).
Likewise, F is a set {fj | j ∈ J} of functions on D, indexed by set J , with associated
arity function n, such that fj ∈ Dn(j) → D. There is a distinguished equality relation =,
which is an equivalence relation on D, such that equality is indistinguishable by relations
and functions:
• if ~d = ~d′ and ~d ∈ ri, where |~d| = |~d′| = m(i), then ~d′ ∈ ri, and
• if ~d = ~d′, where |~d| = |~d′| = n(j), then fj(~d) = fj(~d′).
Constructive models. A constructive model is a tuple (W,≤, s). The purpose of a con-
structive model is to interpret the constructive fragment of the logic, specifically implication
and universal quantification, (whose semantics differ from the classical semantics). W is a
set, the possible worlds. We denote an individual world as w. Intuitively, a world w repre-
sents the state of knowledge of a constructive reasoner. Relation ≤, called the constructive
2From F infer A says F by SAYS-I. Then infer F ⇒ A says F by IMP-I.
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accessibility relation, is a partial order on W . If w ≤ w′, then the constructive reasoner’s
state of knowledge could grow from w to w′. Function s is called the interpretation func-
tion. It assigns a first-order model (Dw,=w, Rw, Fw) to each world w. (Let the individual
elements of Rw be notated as {ri,w | i ∈ I}, and likewise for Fw, as {fj,w | j ∈ J}.) Thus,
s enables a potentially different first-order interpretation at each world. But to help ensure
that the constructive reasoner’s state of knowledge only grows—hence never invalidates a
previously admitted construction—we require s to be monotonic w.r.t.≤. That is, if w ≤ w′
then
• Dw ⊆ Dw′ ,
• d =w d
′ implies d =w′ d′,
• ri,w ⊆ ri,w′, and
• for all ~d such that |~d| = n(j), it holds that fj,w(~d) =w fj,w′(~d).
Constructive modal models. A constructive modal model is a tuple (W,≤, s, P,A). The
purpose of a constructive modal model is to interpret the modal fragment of the logic,
specifically the says connective and the delegation connectives. The first part of a construc-
tive modal model, (W,≤, s), must itself be a constructive model as above. The next part,
P , is a set of principals. Note that we treat principals differently than individuals: although
individuals can vary from world to world in a model, the set of principals is assumed to
be constant across the entire model. This assumption is consistent with other constructive
multimodal logics [9, 11], which have a fixed set of modalities (just  and ♦). However, it
would be interesting in future work to explore removing this assumption.
A is a set {Ap | p ∈ P} of binary relations on W , called the principal accessibility
relations. If (w,w′) ∈ Ap, then in world w, principal p considers world w′ possible. Like
≤ in a constructive model, we require s to be monotonic w.r.t. each Ap. This requirement
enforces a kind of constructivity on each principal p, such that if p is in a world in which
individual d is constructed, then p cannot consider possible any world in which d has not
been constructed.
Constructive modal models thus have two kinds of accessibility relations, constructive
≤ and principal Ap. These relations cannot be completely orthogonal: for sake of sound-
ness, we need to impose four frame conditions that relate constructive accessibility and
principal accessibility.
• F1. If w ≤ w′ and (w, v) ∈ Ap, then there exists a v′ such that v ≤ v′ and (w′, v′) ∈
Ap.
• F2. If (w, v) ∈ Ap and v ≤ v′, then there exists a w′ such that w ≤ w′ and
(w′, v′) ∈ Ap.
• IT. If (w, v) ∈ Ap and (v, u) ∈ Ap, then there exists a w′ such that w ≤ w′ and
(w′, u) ∈ Ap.
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• ID. If (w, u) ∈ Ap, then there exists a w′ and v such that w ≤ w′, and (w′, v) ∈ Ap
as well as (v, u) ∈ Ap.
The need for these frame conditions originates from the proof system rules for says, es-
pecially the latter two rules. It’s well known in modal logic that axioms and rules about
modalities correspond to frame conditions on accessibility relations (see, e.g., chapter 3
of [3]). IT and ID are intuitionistic generalizations of transitivity and density of the Ap re-
lations. In the presence of F1 and F2, IT and ID are necessary and sufficient conditions for
the soundness of the says rules—a result that follows from work by Plotkin and Stirling [7].
Furthermore, F1 and F2 are arguably the right fundamental frame conditions to impose in
a constructive modal logic [9]. In the case of NAL, we could actually remove F1 without
suffering any unsoundness or incompleteness. (F1 is needed only to show soundness of a
♦ modality, which does not exist in NAL.) However, the others—F2, IT, and ID—are all
necessary to impose in NAL1.
NAL models. A NAL model is a tuple (W,≤, s, P,A,∨,⊥,SUB ). The purpose of a NAL
model is to interpret NAL formulas. Specifically, it adds machinery to interpret group and
subprincipals. The first part of a NAL model, (W,≤, s, P,A), must itself be a constructive
modal model as above.
The next part of a NAL model, (∨,⊥), is used to interpret group principals. Specifically,
(P,∨) must be a join semilattice, with ⊥ as its bottom element. (Thus, ⊥ is a principal.
Its intended use is as a principal who believes only tautologies. We do not require the
existence of a top element in the lattice, because there is no need for such an element in
the semantics.) Join operator ∨ is used to take disjunctions of principals—intuitively, p ∨ q
is the principal who believes those statements that either p or q believe, or statements that
logically follow from those. Formally, we require that, for all principals p and q, it holds
that Ap∨q ⊆ Ap.
The SUB part of a NAL model is used to interpret subprincipals. Intuitively, it requires
the existence of a distinguished first-order function subw of type P × Dw → P at each
world w. Further, we require that if subw(p, d) = q, then Ap ⊇ Aq , ensuring that super-
principals speak for subprincipals. Since subw is a function, it must obey the requirement
of monotonicity w.r.t. constructive accessibility relation ≤, just as all other functions fj,w
must in a constructive model.
NAL models for Coq. Finally, a NAL model for Coq is a NAL model extended with a
pair of sets ∆ and Π. This is a technical extension that unfortunately seems to be necessary
in order to express something that is, in actuality, fairly simple set theory. We’d like to
require that set P of principals be a subset of every domain Dw in a NAL model, such
that there is one unchanging set of principals throughout the model. Expressing that idea
in Coq’s type theory turns out to be quite difficult, so we instead stipulate the existence of
two sets of coercion functions, ∆ and Π, between principals and individuals. ∆ is a set
{δw : P → Dw | w ∈ W} of coercion functions that map principals to individuals. Since
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every principal should be represented by a unique domain element, we require each δw to be
injective. Π is a set {πw : Dw → P | w ∈ W} of coercion functions that map individuals
to principals. If individual d does not represent a principal, then δw(d) is ⊥.
Given these coercion functions, it is possible to define equality =P of principals in
terms of equality of individuals: p =P q iff for all w, δw(p) =w δw(q).
NAL semantics. We give a semantics of NAL1 in figure 3. The validity judgment is
written
M,w, v |= φ
where M is a NAL model for Coq and w is a world in that model. Function v is a valuation
mapping first-order variables to individuals; it is used to interpret first-order quantification.
The semantics also relies on an interpretation function µ, defined in figure 4, that maps
syntactic terms τ to individuals.
The first-order constructive fragment of the semantics is routine. The semantics of says
follows from the semantics of a  modality in constructive modal logic [9, 11]. The se-
mantics of delegation⇛ follows from a standard definition in authorization logics [2]. The
semantics of restricted delegation is similar to one presented by Howell [5], and it is a
generalization of the semantics of unrestricted delegation. (To see this, take w′′′ in the se-
mantics of restricted delegation to be the w′′ from the semantics of unrestricted delegation.
Then w′′′ equals w′′, hence is in the same equivalence class.) Restricted delegation uses
an equivalence relation ≡wx:φ on worlds. Intuitively, this relation is used to partition worlds
into equivalence classes that agree on the validity of formula φ in all valuations, assuming
the existence of individuals Dw. Formally, define w′ ≡wx:φ w′′ to hold iff
∀d ∈ Dw : (∀v : M,w
′, v[d/x] |= φ)
⇐⇒ (∀v : M,w′′, v[d/x] |= φ).
The interpretation function is also routine, except for the interpretation of group princi-
pals. That interpretation is similar to the algebra of principals defined in the ABLP logic [2].
5 Soundness
The soundness theorem for NAL1 states that if φ is provable from assumptions Γ, and that
if a model validates all the formulas in Γ, then that model must also validate φ. Therefore,
any provable formula is semantically valid.
Theorem 1 (Soundness). If Γ ⊢ φ and for all ψ ∈ Γ, it holds that M,w, v |= ψ, then
M,w, v |= φ.
A Coq mechanization of the proof of Soundness is in progress. Currently, it contains
about 3,000 lines of code and implements all of the proof except for the cases of delegation
and restricted delegation.
The current proof also requires adding an additional assumption as an axiom: for all
w and w′, if w ≤ w′, or if there a exists p such that (w,w′) ∈ Ap, then it must hold
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that µ(M,w, v)(τ) = µ(M,w′, v)(τ). This axiom is actually provable as a theorem for
all terms τ except for group principals. Discharging this assumption for group principals
remains an open problem.
Acknowledgments
Fred B. Schneider consulted on the design of the proof system and the Kripke semantics.
We thank him, Martı´n Abadi, Deepak Garg, and Colin Stirling for discussions related to
this work. This work was supported in part by AFOSR grants F9550-06-0019, FA9550-11-
1-0137, and FA9550-12-1-0334, National Science Foundation grants 0430161, 0964409,
and CCF-0424422 (TRUST), ONR grants N00014-01-1-0968 and N00014-09-1-0652, and
a grant from Microsoft.
References
[1] Martı´n Abadi. Access control in a core calculus of dependency. Electronic Notes in
Theoretical Computer Science, 172:5–31, April 2007.
[2] Martı´n Abadi, Michael Burrows, Butler Lampson, and Gordon Plotkin. A calculus for
access control in distributed systems. ACM Transactions on Programming Languages
and Systems, 15(4):706–734, September 1993.
[3] Ronald Fagin, Joseph Y. Halpern, Yoram Moses, and Moshe Y. Vardi. Reasoning
About Knowledge. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1995.
[4] Valerio Genovese, Deepak Garg, and Daniele Rispoli. Labeled sequent calculi for
access control logics: Countermodels, saturation and abduction. In Proc. IEEE Com-
puter Security Foundations Symposium (CSF), pages 139–153, 2012.
[5] Jonathan Howell. Naming and Sharing Resources across Administrative Domains.
PhD thesis, Dartmouth College, 2000.
[6] George Edward Hughes and Max J. Cresswell. A New Introduction to Modal Logic.
Routledge, London, 1996.
[7] Gordon Plotkin and Colin Stirling. A framework for intuitionistic modal logics. In
Proc. Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge (TARK),
pages 399–406, 1986.
[8] Fred B. Schneider, Kevin Walsh, and Emin Gu¨n Sirer. Nexus authorization logic
(NAL): Design rationale and applications. ACM Transactions on Information and
System Security, 14(1):8:1–28, June 2011.
[9] Alex K. Simpson. The Proof Theory and Semantics of Intuitionistic Modal Logic.
PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1994.
8
[10] Anne Sjerp Troelstra and Dirk van Dalen. Constructivism in Mathematics: Volume
I, volume 121 of Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics. Elsevier,
Amsterdam, 1988.
[11] Duminda Wijesekera. Constructive modal logics I. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic,
50(3):271–301, December 1990.
9
Γ, φ ⊢ φ
Γ ⊢ φ
Γ, ψ ⊢ φ
Γ ⊢ true
Γ ⊢ false
Γ ⊢ φ
Γ ⊢ φ Γ ⊢ ψ
Γ ⊢ φ ∧ ψ
Γ ⊢ φ ∧ ψ
Γ ⊢ φ
Γ ⊢ φ ∧ ψ
Γ ⊢ ψ
Γ ⊢ φ1
Γ ⊢ φ1 ∨ φ2
Γ ⊢ φ2
Γ ⊢ φ1 ∨ φ2
Γ ⊢ φ1 ∨ φ2 Γ, φ1 ⊢ ψ Γ, φ2 ⊢ ψ
Γ ⊢ ψ
Γ, φ ⊢ ψ
Γ ⊢ φ⇒ ψ
Γ ⊢ φ Γ ⊢ φ⇒ ψ
Γ ⊢ ψ
Γ, φ ⊢ false
Γ ⊢ ¬φ
Γ ⊢ φ Γ ⊢ ¬φ
Γ ⊢ false
Γ ⊢ φ x 6∈ FV (Γ)
Γ ⊢ (∀x : φ)
Γ ⊢ (∀x : φ)
Γ ⊢ φ[τ/x]
Γ ⊢ φ[τ/x]
Γ ⊢ (∃x : φ)
Γ ⊢ (∃x : φ) Γ, φ ⊢ ψ x 6∈ FV (Γ, ψ)
Γ ⊢ ψ
Γ ⊢ φ
p says Γ ⊢ p says φ
p says Γ ⊢ φ
p says Γ ⊢ p says φ
Γ ⊢ p says φ
p says Γ ⊢ p says φ
Figure 1: Derivability judgment for formulas
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Γ ⊢ τ = τ
Γ ⊢ τ1 = τ2
Γ ⊢ τ2 = τ1
Γ ⊢ τ1 = τ2 Γ ⊢ τ2 = τ3
Γ ⊢ τ1 = τ3
Γ ⊢ τ1 = τ
′
1 . . . Γ ⊢ τn = τ
′
n
Γ ⊢ f(τ1, . . . , τn) = f(τ
′
1, . . . , τ
′
n)
Γ ⊢ r(τ1, . . . , τn) Γ ⊢ τ1 = τ
′
1 . . . Γ ⊢ τn = τ
′
n
Γ ⊢ r(τ ′1, . . . , τ
′
n)
Γ ⊢ τ2 says τ1 ⇛ τ2
Γ ⊢ τ1 ⇛ τ2
Γ ⊢ τ2 says τ1 ⇛ τ2 on (x : φ)
Γ ⊢ τ1 ⇛ τ2 on (x : φ)
Γ ⊢ τ1 ⇛ τ2 Γ ⊢ τ1 says φ
Γ ⊢ τ2 says φ
Γ ⊢ τ1 ⇛ τ2 on (x : φ) Γ ⊢ τ1 says φ[τ/x]
Γ ⊢ τ2 says φ[τ/x]
Γ ⊢ τ ⇛ τ Γ ⊢ τ ⇛ τ on (x : φ)
Γ ⊢ τ1 ⇛ τ2 Γ ⊢ τ2 ⇛ τ3
Γ ⊢ τ1 ⇛ τ3
Γ ⊢ τ1 ⇛ τ2 on (x : φ) Γ ⊢ τ2 ⇛ τ3 on (x : φ)
Γ ⊢ τ1 ⇛ τ3 on (x : φ)
Γ ⊢ φ[τ/x]
Γ ⊢ τ ⇛ {x : φ}
Γ, φ ⊢ x⇛ τ x 6∈ FV (τ)
Γ ⊢ {x : φ}⇛ τ
Γ ⊢ τ1 ⇛ τ1.τ2
Figure 2: Derivability judgment for terms
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M,w, v |= true always
M,w, v |= false never
M,w, v |= ri(~τ) iff µ(M,w, v)(~τ ) ∈ ri,w
M,w, v |= τ = τ ′ iff µ(M,w, v)(τ) =w µ(M,w, v)(τ ′)
M,w, v |= φ1 ∧ φ2 iff M,w, v |= φ1 and M,w, v |= φ2
M,w, v |= φ1 ∨ φ2 iff M,w, v |= φ1 or M,w, v |= φ2
M,w, v |= φ1 ⇒ φ2 iff for all w′ ≥ w : M,w′, v |= φ1
implies M,w′, v |= φ2
M,w, v |= ¬φ iff for all w′ ≥ w : M,w′, v 6|= φ
M,w, v |= (∀x : φ) iff for all w′ ≥ w, d ∈ Dw′ : M,w′, v[d/x] |= φ
M,w, v |= (∃x : φ) iff there exists d ∈ Dw : M,w, v[d/x] |= φ
M,w, v |= τ says φ iff for all w′, w′′ : w ≤ w′ and (w′, w′′) ∈ Aµ(M,w,v)(τ)
implies M,w′′, v |= φ
M,w, v |= τ1 ⇛ τ2 iff for all w′, w′′ : (w′, w′′) ∈ Aµ(M,w,v)(τ2)
implies (w′, w′′) ∈ Aµ(M,w,v)(τ1)
M,w, v |= τ1 ⇛ τ2 on (x : φ) iff for all w′, w′′ : (w′, w′′) ∈ Aµ(M,w,v)(τ2)
there exists w′′′ : w′′ ≡w′x:φ w′′′
and (w′, w′′′) ∈ Aµ(M,w,v)(τ1)
Figure 3: Validity judgment
µ(M,w, v)(x) = v(x)
µ(M,w, v)(fj(~τ)) = fj,w(µ(M,w, v)(~τ ))
µ(M,w, v)(τ1.τ2) = subw(µ(M,w, v)(τ1), µ(M,w, v)(τ2))
µ(M,w, v)({x : φ}) = (
∨
p : M,w, v[p/x] |= φ : p)
Figure 4: Interpretation function
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